Interpersonal differences in social dilemmas:a game theoretical approach by Liebrand, Wilhelmus Bernardus Gerhardus
  
 University of Groningen
Interpersonal differences in social dilemmas
Liebrand, Wilhelmus Bernardus Gerhardus
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
1982
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Liebrand, W. B. G. (1982). Interpersonal differences in social dilemmas: a game theoretical approach. s.n.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
CHAPTER 2
A CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES
Social dilemmas have been defined by Dawes (1975) as situations in
which: (1) each person has available a dominating strategy, i.e., one
which yields the person the best payoff in ALL circumstances; and in
which (2) the collective choice of dominating strategies results in a
deficient outcome, that is, a result that is less preferred by all
persons than the result which would have occurred if all had not
chosen their dominating strategy. Dawes' requirement of a dominating
strategy (1975, 1980) for each person does not appear to be crucial
for considering a situation a social dilemma. What is critical is that
a strategy can be chosen which ultimately results in an outcome which
is deficient for all persons involved, and which nonetheless can be
attractive since in SOME circumstances that strategy yields the best
payoff for the person choosing that strategy.
Relaxing the dominance assumption enables one to evaluate more
situations that have the psychologica) characteristics of social di-
lemmas. For this reason, in the present research a broader definition
of the concept of social dilemma is formulated and employed. Here, a
social dilemma is defined as a situation in which: (1) there is a
strategy which yields the person the best payoff in at least one con-
figuration of strategy choices, which has a negative impact on the in-
terest of the other persons involved; and in which (2) the choice of
that particular strategy by all persons results in a deficient out-
come. The Jatter definition still has the advantage of being based on
comparison of payoffs only WITHIN an individual (cf. Dawes, 1980). It
differs from Dawes' definition in that instead of the dominant strate-
gy which yields the best payoff in all circumstances, a strategy is
employed which depending upon others' choices, might yield the best
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payoff; it matches Dawes' definition in that the choosing of that very
strategy, does have negative consequences for others, and ultimately
will result in a deficient outcome for all.
The parallelism between n-person games and social dilemmas has
been noted frequently (Brechner, 1977; Dawes, Delay & Chaplin, 1974;
Edney & Harper, 1978; Kelley & Grzelak, 1972; Kahan, 1974; Messick,
1973). Moreover, some n-person game classifications have been proposed
(Dawes, 1980; Goehring & Kahan, 1976; Komorita, 1976; Weil, 1966).
The present chapter attempts to extend this line of research, by in-
vestigating which game settings are capable of capturing the essence
of the social dilemma structure as defined above. Drawing heavily on
the work of Hamburger (1973, 1974), all 2-person 2-alternative games
possessing social dilemma properties will be selected. Next, based on
the 2-person social dilemma games, a classification of n-person social
dilemma games is proposed. And finally, it will be shown that the
present classification extends earlier classification schemes.
TWO-PERSON TWO-ALTERNATIVE GAMES WITH SOCIAL DILEMMA PROPERTIES
In the so called 2 x 2 games, each of two players has to choose,
privately, one of two alternatives. The consequences to each player of
each possible combination of choices, specified in the payoff matrix
of the game, are known to both players in advance. The strategic pro-
perties of different types of 2 x 2 games can be analyzed by comparing
the payoff matrices of the games.
The number of different 2 x 2 games which can be constructed is
infinite. Therefore, following Rapoport and Guyer (1966), some re-
strictions are introduced. First, the present analysis is based upon
the preference ordering of the four payoffs as they appear to the one
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and to the other player. Second it is supposed that each player has a
strict preference ordering of the four possible payoffs. Given the
two restrictions, there still are 4! x 4! = 576 ways to fill up the
payoff matrix. After eliminating games which are invariant up to an
interchange of rows and/or columns and/or players, there are 78 non—
equivalent 2 x 2 games possible, (Rapoport & Guyer, 1966). In this
section, a subclass of these nonequivalent 2 x 2 games will be con-
sidered. This subclass consists of games which are both (a) symmetrie,
— — that is, games which "look the same" to both players (Harris,
1969, p. 139), and (b) which also possess the two social dilemma pro-
perties described previously. As is shown below, there are only three
2 x 2 game formats conforming to these requirements.
Setting aside the attractiveness restriction for a moment, the
first social dilemma property is tantamount to the availability of a
strategy having negative consequences for the other person. This pro-
perty reduces the number of potentially relevant games to those games
where both players have a most—threatening strategy. A strategy is
called most—threatening if a rational Player 1 prefers Player 2 not to
choose that strategy, irrespective of Player 1's choice. In such a
case Player 2 has a most—threatening strategy (Hamburger, 1973;1974).
Following Hamburger's (1974) method of proof, it is easily seen that
there are exactly six symmetrie games where each player has the choice
between strategy A and the most—threatening strategy B.
First, a player's strict preference ordering of the four
payoffs is labelled 4, 3, 2, 1 in decreasing order of preference.
Then the payoffs to each player can be distributed into the four cells
of the payoff matrix in such a way that the outcome to Player 1 is al-
ways stated first in a cell. Next, without reducing the number of 78
nonequivalent 2 x 2 games, it is possible to put Player l's most-
threatening strategy in the second row, and Player 2's most—threaten-
ing strategy in the second column. Given this strategy configuration,
it follows that the payoffs to Player 1 in the left column must be
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Table 1
Six symmetrie 2 x 2 games; alternative B is each player's
most—threatening strategy; entries are preference orderings:
(4)	best possible outcome, (1)	worst possible outcome;
the first entry refers to Player 1, the second to Player 2;
Player 1 is row player, Player 2 is column player.
A	B A	B A	B
	
A 3,3 1,4	A 3,3 2,4	A 4,4 1,3
B 4,1 2,2 B 4,2 1,1	B 3,1 2,2
Matrix 1	Matrix 2	Matrix 3
	A	B A	B A	B
A 2,2 1,4	A 4,4 2,3	A 4,4 3,2
B 4,1	3,3 B 3,2	1,1 B 2,3	1,1
Matrix 4 Matrix 5	Matrix 6
higher than his or her' payoffs in the right column. Therefore,
payoff 4 to Player 1 can appear only in two outcome cells, the other
payoff to Player 1 in the same row can be either 3, 2, or 1. After as-
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signing two payoffs in this way, the other payoffs to Player 1 are
uniquely determined. Consequently, a total of 6 different payoff con-
figurations to Player 1 can be distinguished. Finally, out of the 6
(Player 1) x 6 (Player 2) = 36 payoff matrices, only the six sym-
metrie matrices have to be considered. These six matrices are shown in
Table 1.
Having a most—threatening strategy thus reduces the number of 2 x
2 games to be considered to six. However, Social Dilemma Property 1
furthermore implies that this most—threatening strategy has to be at-
tractive to at least one rational player. Here, strategy B is consid-
ered to be potentially attractive if, for at least one pair of strate-
gy—choices, strategy B yields the best payoff to at least one player.
In other words, all the payoff matrices in which strategy A is a dom-
inant strategy, have to be eliminated. In Table 1 this affects Ma-
trices 5 and 6.
Finally, Social Dilemma Property 2 eliminates the game depicted
in Matrix 4. In 2—person settings, Property 2 states that both players
are better off if both choose A than if both choose B. Since the pair
of outcomes resulting from both players choosing B is higher than the
outcomes resulting from an A choice by both players, the restriction
imposed by Property 2 is not fulfilled in Matrix 4.
Out of the three symmetrie 2 x 2 games with social dilemma pro-
perties, Matrix 1 and Matrix 2 have undergone extensive experimental
investigation. Matrix 1 is the well—known Prisoner's Dilemma Game
(Luce & Raiffa, 1957); Matrix 2 is known as Chicken (Kahn, 1965). The
game depicted in Matrix 3, labelled by Rapoport and Guyer (1966, p.
209) as trivial no—conflict game, is not very well known. For present
purposes Matrix 3 will be labelled the "Trust Game".
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THE DECISIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PRISONER'S,
THE CHICKEN AND THE TRUST SOCIAL DILEMMA
The following anecdote, taken from Luce and Raiffa (1957) illus-
trates both the name and the social dilemma properties of the Prison-
er's Dilemma. Two individuals, accused of robbing a bank, are taken
into custody and separated. The district attorney, unable to prove
that they are guilty, confronts each prisoner with two alternatives:
either confess to the crime (Alternative B), or not confess to it (Al-
ternative A). If both suspects confess, each will receive a 5—years'
sentence. If neither suspect confesses, both will be convicted on some
minor charge and receive a 1—month sentence. If one confesses and the
other does not, the suspect who does not confess will receive a
10—years' sentence while the other will be set free. The consequences
associated with the four possible combinations of choices are such
that they result in the preference orderings depicted in Matrix 1
(Table 1). The ordering for each prisoner is strict, ranging from 1
(worst outcome: 10—years sentence) to 4 (best outcome: free). As ap-
pears from the preference orderings it is to each prisoner's advantage
to confess, regardless of the other's choice. However, if both prison-
ers act in their own interest and confess, they both end up in a worse
position (5—years sentence) than in case they do not confess (1—month
sentence). The Prisoner's Dilemma is an example of a mixed—motive
game, there is a motive to cooperate (A: not confess), and there is
the incompatible motive to defect (B: confess). The specific ordering
of payoffs as depicted in Matrix 1 results in two important properties
of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. First, each player has a dominating
strategy. Second, if both players choose their dominant strategy,
which is prescibed by the principle to maximize the payoff or the
principle to maximize the minimum payoff (maximin), a deficient out-
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come results.
The term "Chicken" (Matrix 2) applies to a game which is accord-
ing to Broeze (Note 2) popular among American teenagers. Two young
Americans are sitting in a fast driving car. The driver takes his
hands off the steering wheel. The "chicken" is the one first taking
the steering wheel (A-alternative), giving the other thereby the
highest payoff. However, the joint disaster, or the worst outcome for
both results from a joint refusal to steer again.
In contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, in Chicken the most-
threatening strategy is not a dominating strategy. In Chicken the
most-threatening strategy B is the strategy to be selected by players
trying to get the highest payoff (maximax principle). Both in Prison-
er's Dilemma and in Chicken a double B-choice results in a deficient
outcome. Only in Chicken, however, is this deficient outcome the
worst possible outcome.
Finally, the following anecdote illustrate the decisional struc-
ture of the Trust Game. In order to decide which one is the best
long-distance runner, two athletes plan to run a marathon. Both prefer
an honest race to a race in which one or both of them are using a drug
(alternative B). However, given that the other is going to use dope,
each prefers to use dope so as to avoid being at a disadvantage in the
race.
The most-threatening strategy B (i.e., to use drugs) is not a
dominating strategy in the Trust Game. Choosing B, however, clearly is
prescribed by the well-known strategy to maximize the minimum payoff
(maximin principle). Doing so results in a deficient outcome for both
players.
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FROM MATRICES TO GRAPHS
To represent payoffs in three— or more—person games in the same
way as was done for 2 x 2 games, a three or more dimensional matrix
would be required. To avoid these cumbersome matrices, a graphical
representation is used in Figure 1 to illustrate the three games dis-
cussed above.
Again the B—alternative corresponds to the most—threatening
strategy, the A—alternative to the common interest strategy. The
number of players choosing alternative A is depicted on the horizontal
axis; the two payoff graphs for each game refer to the payoffs for a
player choosing either A or B, given a particular total number of A—
choices. The correspondence between Matrices 1 to 3 (Table 1) and
Graphs 1 to 3 (Figure 1) can be seen by comparing the payoff order-
ings. On the one hand the payoff orderings are presented by the matrix
cell entries, on the other hand they are presented by the end points
of the graphs. For example, in Prisoner's Dilemma (Matrix 1; Graph
1), the payoff graph for choosing B includes the highest payoff (4),
and lies in all circumstances (0, 1, or 2 A—choices) above the graph
for choosing A. However, the end point representing the payoff for









Three 2x2 games possessing social
dilemma properties; alternative B
is the most—threatening strategy
A—choices
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Three n—person social dilemma




















FROM TWO—PERSON TO N—PERSON GAMES
In turning from two—person to three— or more—person games, some
distinctive characteristics are introduced (Dawes, 1980). First, in
two—person games there is one opponent, choosing either A or B, so
that each player knows with certainty how the other has behaved from
the payoff received. In n—person games this identification is impos-
sible. As long as not all the other players make the same choice, all
personal choices remain secret. Second, the influence of one
individual's choice on the other's payoff, called the "externality"
(Buchanan, 1971; Schelling, 1973), is spread out over a considerable
number of players. In contrast, in two—person games, negative or po-
sitive externalities are focussed, they directly punish or reward the
other player.
The increased anonimity and the greater spread of externalities
do not alter the decision structure in the three types of social di-
lemmas. They may lower the threshold for choosing the most—threatening
strategy — — constituting thereby, compared to the 2—person version,
an even more threatening situation. Thus, regarding the parallelism
between the decision structure of the 2—person and the n—person games,
the three 2 x 2 games with social dilemma properties provide a useful
classification for n—person social dilemma games. In the following
three real—life examples are used to illustrate the payoff graphs of
the three types of n—person social dilemma games. In order to simplify
the analysis, the choices of subgroups consisting of 1/4 n persons are
considered to be equal. Consequently, the payoff graphs are defined in
case 4/4 n, 3/4 n, 2/4 n, 1/4 n, or 0 persons have chosen alternative
A.
Prisoner's Social Dilemma. The decision to pollute may be de-
scribed by the Prisoner's Social Dilemma payoff graphs in Figure 2
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(cf. Dawes et al., 1974; Goehring & Kahan, 1976). Pollution problems
can be found at various levels of decision making, ranging from indi-
viduals to nations. For example, at the industrial level, no matter
what other chemical industries may do to get rid of their chemical
waste, it is cheaper to have the waste dumped at some rubbish—dump, or
alternatively, in the ocean, than to take care of an adequate decompo-
sition of the waste. The ultimate long—term consequences of this self-
ish act have to be shared by all individuals. At the individual level
the slogan "every litter bit hurts" nicely reflects the negative ex-
ternalities accompanying the decision to pollute (alternative B).
Though all individuals would like to avoid the long—term negative con-
sequences, it remains cheaper and simpler for them to keep polluting
as anonymous individuals. The payoff graph for polluting lies for its
entire length above the graph indicating the payoff for not polluting.
Chicken Social Dilemma. In the process of deciding whether to go
by bike (alternative A) or by car (alternative B), an individual try-
ing to get to work as fast as possible is facing a Chicken Social Di-
lemma. In this type of social dilemma the payoff for choosing either A
or B, strongly depends upon the number of others deciding to go by
bike (A). If hardly anybody goes by bike, there will be many cars on
the road and consequently there will be traffic jams. That being so,
our decision maker is better off going by bike than by car. In Graph
2 (Figure 2) this situation is reflected to the left of the intersec-
tion where the payoff graph for alternative A lies above the one for
alternative B. Instead of going by bike, the same person is better
off going by car if many people decide to go by bike: to the right of
the intersection the payoff for alternative A becomes less and less
attractive. In case everybody decides to go by car the worst possible
outcome for all occurs. The accumulation of the negative externalities
is then expressed in congestion and polluted air. In that case, each
person would prefer a situation in which neither of them would use a
car.
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Trust Social Dilemma. There are times at which a food supply is
not excessive but sufficient. Any initiation of hoarding, however,
generates a Trust Social Dilemma. Clearly the highest payoff results
from no hoarding at all (alternative A). Not hoarding food, for exam-
ple milk, provides no additional costs for preservation while there is
enough milk available in the stores. If only a small number of per-
sons are keeping a lot of milk in reserve, one is better off not
hoarding milk. In Graph 3 (Figure 2) this is reflected by the payoff
graphs to the right of the intersection. But if the number of persons
hoarding milk increases, the attractiveness of one's own hoarding in-
creases. At the end, thanks to the massive hoarding there will be no
more milk available in the stores. Consequently, in that case the
worst possible payoff accrues to the person who had chosen alternative
A.
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES
Most n-person game ciassifications consider the Prisoner's Dilem-
mas. Typically, a n-person 2-alternative Prisoner's Dilemma (n > 2) is
defined by:
(1) B(j-1) > A(j)	j = 1, 2, . .	n
(2) A(n) > B(0)
where the index within parentheses represents the number of A-choices;
B(j) the payoff to each player choosing B, given the total of j A-
choices; and A(j) the payoff for choosing A in that case.
Weil (1966) suggests a categorization based on the algebraic
sign of ( A(j) - A(j-1) ) on the one hand, and ( B(j) - B(j-1) ) on
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the other hand. Together with the assumption that all members of the
set ( A(j) — A(j-1) ) and the set ( B(j) — B(j-1) ) are alike with
respect to algebraic sign, and the restriction that j is not equal to
n, four cases can be distinguished: POSITIVE—POSITIVE, POSITIVE-
NEGATIVE, NEGATIVE—POSITIVE and NEGATIVE—NEGATIVE. Both Weil (1966)
and Goehring and Kahan (1976) consider the POSITIVE—POSITIVE case the
one in which most applications to the real world can be found.
Goehring and Kahan further subdivide Weil's POSITIVE—POSITIVE
case, or those games having payoff functions increasing with the
number of A—choices, into three types of Prisoner's Dilemma games.
Type 1 and Type 2 consists of those games having payoff functions
whereby ( B(j-1) — A(j) ) increases or decreases with the total number
of A—choices, respectively. Type 3 in Goehring and Kahan's classifi-
cation consists of those games having linear parallel payoff func-
tions. They designate this type of game the "uniform" Prisoner's Di-
lemma.
Dawes does make a still further subdivision of the uniform Pris-
oner's Dilemmas. Following Hamburger (1973), he distinguishes "take
some" and "give some" games. The difference between the two games lies
in the procedures used: in take some one can take some from others,
and in give some one can contribute to a common good. In addition to
these uniform games, Dawes' classification of social dilemma games
consists of "variable games", or games which because of their compli-
cated rules and regulations defy a simple mathematical description of
the payoff configuration. (e.g., Rubenstein, Watzke, Doctor & Dana,
1975).
All the above classifications are based on Prisoner's Dilemmas
conforming to specific requirements. In addition to these classifica-
tions, one more model of n—person games has been proposed (Komorita,
1976). Komorita (p. 358) defines n—person dilemmas rather unconven-
tionally. He defines the essential conditions as: "1. each of n per-
sons has two choices, cooperative (A) or competitive (B); 2. the out-
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comes for both choices increase monotonically with the proportion of
people who make the cooperative choice; 3. the competitive choice al-
ways yields a higher outcome than the cooperative choice; and 4. the
outcome if everyone makes a cooperative choice is greater than the
outcome if everyone makes a competitive choice." Next, Komorita (p.
359,360) states that "the essential condition that the B—choice domi-
nates the A—choice implies that . . . B(j) > A(j)". In defining the
concept of dominance in this way, it is possible that B(j-1) < A(j),
that is becoming the (j-1) + 1st A—chooser yields a higher payoff than
the B choice would afford in that case. This very payoff configura-
tion does not satisfy the Prisoner's Dilemma requirements. On the oth-
er hand, given a Prisoner's Dilemma Komorita's condition B(j) > A(j)
is true. Consequently, Komorita's model captures more types of games
than just the Prisoner's Dilemma. In addition Komorita proposes an in-
dex of cooperation (K*) based on Rapoport's (1967) index for the two-
person Prisoner's Dilemma. K* is defined by Komorita as:
A(n) — B(0) / 0(max) — 0(min)
where 0(Max) and 0(min) denote the maximum and minimum possible out-
comes. The index K* then serves to distinguish different types of n—
person dilemma games. However, K* can take the same value given two
different types of n—person games. For example, consider the Chicken
social dilemma and the Trust social Dilemma depicted in Figure 1. If
the payoff graphs represent numerical values ranging from 4 to 1, K*
equals (3-1)1(4-1) for the Chicken Dilemma and (4-2)/(4-1) for the
Trust Dilemma. Taking into account the insensitiveness of K* for dif-
ferent payoff structuren, in the present research Komorita's model is
considered not a useful model for classifying n—person dilemma games.
As was stated previously, the present ciassification extends the
above classifications in that it consists of three different types of
social dilemma games, based on an exhaustive set of 2 x 2 games. It
consists of the Prisoner's Social Dilemma, of which no further subdi—
vision is provided, the Chicken Social Dilemma and the Trust Social
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Dilemma. Until now empirical research has been focussed on the Pris-
oner's Social Dilemma (Dawes et al., 1977; Caldwell, 1976; Kelley &
Grzelak, 1972) and the Chicken Social Dilemma (Meux, 1973). However,
there seems to be no apparent reason to exclude the Trust Social Di-
lemma from n—person game research.
DISCUSSION
Social dilemmas were defined as situations in which by the very
act of choosing a strategy with negative externalities, the ultimate
outcome can be called deficient. Starting from Rapoport and Guyer's
(1966) taxonomy of nonequivalent 2 x 2 games, it has been shown that
exactly three of these games possess the social dilemma properties as
defined. Next, it appeared that the decision structure underlying dif-
ferent real—life situations can be properly captured by the n—person
generalizations of the three 2 x 2 social dilemma games.
The payoff configuration for the three types of social dilemmas
provides insight into the reasons for behaving in such a way that a
deficient collective outcome results. Not choosing the dominant
strategy with negative externalities in a Prisoner's Social Dilemma is
called an irrational way of behaving. Two other "rational" ways of
behaving or selection principles can be distinguished (Hamburger,
1979, p. 42). The principle of maximizing the maximum payoff and the
principle of maximizing the minimum payoff both prescribe the decision
to choose the strategy with negative externalities, in a Chicken— and
a Trust Social Dilemma, respectively. So, in all three types of social
dilemmas the behavior which is not in the service of the common in-
terest is prescribed by the above selection principles. It follows
that the most likely outcome is the deficient outcome.	Hence, the
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development of solutions to avoid the deficient outcomes can be called
the most important task of the social dilemma paradigm.
The three types of n—person social dilemma games provide a
promising research tool for the development of such solutions. The
social dilemma mechanism can be captured in laboratory analogues. It
is a common observation, that in such instances subjects do take the
decision task extremely serious (Bonacich, 1976; Dawes et al., 1977).
Dawes et al. (p. 7), for example, write:
One of the most significant aspects of this study, however, did
not show up in the data analysis. It is the extreme seriousness
with which the subjects take the problems. Comments such as, "If
you defect on the rest of us, you're going to live with it the
rest of your life," were not at all uncommon. Nor was it unusual
for people to wish to leave the experimental building by the back
door, to claim that they did not wish to see the "sons of
bitches" who double—crossed them, to become extremely angry at
other subjects, or to become tearful.
However, in employing games as a research tool one significant problem
is the way in which the payoff matrix as presented by the experimenter
is actually experienced by the subjects. Kelley and Thibaut (1978)
point out that the outcome matrix presented by an experimenter, which
may be described as the "given" matrix, may not be the one on which
the decisions of the actors are based. Rather actors may transform the
outcomes in a given matrix into utilities according to the personal
values they place on the alternative outcome distributions their
choices would afford themselves and other persons (Harris, 1969; Kel-
ley & Thibaut, 1978; McClintock, 1972). Kelley and Thibaut describe
this process as one of moving from a "given" to an "effective" matrix.
In the present chapter it was assumed throughout that each player
has a strict preference ordering of the outcomes, or alternatively,
matrix cell entries represent player's utilities. Given these utili-
ties each person faces the same type of dilemma. However, it follows
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that differentially transforming the numerical outcomes in the cells
of the given matrix affects the structure of the game accordingly. For
example, suppose that the numerical outcomes in Matrix 1 (Table 1)
represent money instead of utilities. The Prisoner's Dilemma struc-
ture, evident for a person focussed on payoffs to self, is then absent
for a person trying to maximize the other's payoff (altruism). A for-
tiori, such a dollar representation of either Matrix 1, Matrix 2, or
Matrix 3 (Table 1), would not generate a social dilemma at all, if all
persons were more concerned with the payoff to others than with their
own payoff. Such a case, however, is considered strictly hypothetical
here. In the present research, subjects are confronted with a decision
task in which at least for persons only concerned with their own
payoff, the social dilemma structure exists. In Chapter 3 this experi-
mental decision task will be described in more detail and a model will
be proposed to capture the process of differentially transforming -the
given matrix. In addition, specific predictions derived from the pro-
posed model will be investigated in two experiments under different
experimental conditions.
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